

Interpreting Pablo Manlapit

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Pablo Manlapit was a labor leader in Hawai'i in the 1920s and 1930s. Consequently, he was forced to leave Hawai'i temporarily for California and then permanently for the Philippines. While in the Philippines, he served in the national arena as a bureaucrat for Filipino presidents from the time of Manuel L. Quezon through Elpidio P. Quirino. In the mid 1950s he became active again in organized labor.

Foes, friends, and families of Manlapit give varied and, sometimes, contradictory explanations for his actions at different places and periods of his life. Manlapit, himself, also provides reasons for acting as he did. Using new material from several archives and information from descendants of Manlapit, this essay adds another into that pool of interpretations. The main question we seek to answer is this: Given his militancy while in Hawai'i, how do we interpret his actions in the Philippines? To answer this question, we shall focus on major episodes of his life, leaving out details for a longer study later.

Family Background

Pablo Manlapit was born on 17 January 1891 in Lipa, Batangas to a working class family, which we deduce from a bit muddled but significant information supplied by his descendants.¹ His father was reportedly a shoemaker and had a small shoeshop. He also allegedly grew coffee in his own plot while working as a tenant for a rice landlord. We also consulted other accounts describing the participation of the upper and middle classes in Lipa's economy (such as the coffee industry boom in the 1850s) and politics (the revolution against Spain in 1896 and the subsequent war against the United States of America beginning in 1899). These do not mention the Manlapit family.² Likewise Manlapit's descendants do not recall any of their forebears joining the struggle during the revolutionary period. They do not talk of a Manlapit *katipunero*. A nephew recalls that Pablo's father, after noticing the American presence and sensing good business prospects, opened a small shop to bake bread for them.

The Manlapit family's economic situation improved after their migration to Manila sometime in 1908 or 1909. As for the reason for moving to Manila, it was probably economic since many people from the countryside had been moving to Manila in search of better fortune.³ His father was hired as a security guard by the British trading firm Smith Bell & Company, a steady job which enabled him to send his eldest son (Eulogio) to Ateneo de Manila, a Jesuit-run school, to

complete high school. Perhaps the plan was to send Pablo, the second son, to Ateneo later. Meantime, Pablo worked for different government offices as a messenger and general clerk. Then an American construction firm in Corregidor hired him as a timekeeper, but he did not stay there for long because, as he later claimed, he was dismissed for his labor union activities.⁴

We have yet to find corroborating evidence for Pablo's early labor activity before he went to Hawai'i. Perhaps it was a matter of luck. Had he worked for the Bureau of Printing (with Hermenegildo Cruz, Felipe Mendoza, and Crisanto Evangelista) or in one of the several cigar and cigarette factories in the city, he would have been swept into the mainstream of the labor movement. Then we would have some information on him for this early period because the printers and the tobacco factory workers published journals and souvenir programs. It was only many years later in 1923, when Pablo was already in Hawai'i, that Cruz, who by then was the director of the Philippine Bureau of Labor, and Manlapit exchanged letters.

Had he stayed home, perhaps Pablo could have continued his studies, or he could have easily found a job as a clerk in the expanding bureaucracy formed during the American regime in the Philippines. Pablo's younger brothers, in fact, followed this route to become clerks in the Bureau of Customs; one of them later shifted to customs brokerage and became very wealthy. But Pablo's mind was somewhere else. Without his parents' knowledge and permission, Pablo signed up to go to Hawai'i as a plantation worker. Since there was no compelling reason or strong economic push for him to leave, he probably was just curious to find out what was beyond Manila Bay.

At that time the information and advertisements from the recruitment office of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association in San Nicolas, Manila painted a positive picture of Hawai'i. One such ad in the *Taliba* Tagalog newspaper mentioned wage rates in Hawai'i to be P40 monthly for a male worker and P14 for female and child workers per month. Also the following would be supplied free of charge: travel fare, clothing, cigarettes, mats, pillows, blankets, towel, soap, plate, etc. And once in Hawai'i, housing, water, fuel, medicine, and doctor's services would be provided. Anyone who signed up would be given P10. Finally, Hawai'i was like home: "Hawai'i is just like the Philippines: no winter, no tigers, no cobra nor other poisonous animals and grasses."⁵ It is possible that Pablo learned about Hawai'i from similar newspaper ads or directly from the recruiters.

Filipinos were first recruited as laborers for Hawai'i in 1906, a desperate effort by Hawai'i sugarcane planters to stabilize the supply of cheap labor for the

booming sugar industry. Before the Philippines, the planters had recruited Chinese, Norwegians, Germans, Portuguese, Japanese, and Koreans to work in Hawai'i. But despite great hopes in the Philippines, the recruiters persuaded only 15 men to go to Hawai'i in 1906. The next year, 150 men agreed to go but there was no recruitment push the following year because many planters believed that the whole recruitment scheme in the Philippines had been a failure. The Japanese plantation workers' strike in 1909, however, forced the planters to take a second look at the Philippines and to tap it again as a source of labor.⁶

As family stories go, Pablo tried to leave at least twice but his parents, who discovered his plans, prevented him from leaving. They literally plucked him out of the ship at the docks. He finally succeeded in leaving on 10 January 1910 aboard the S.S. Mongolia with 280 Filipinos bound for Hawai'i's plantations. As his birthday was on January 17th, he had just turned 19 when he disembarked in Honolulu on 17 February 1910.

Stay in Hawai'i

In a general sense, Hawai'i in the early 1900s had a distinct similarity with the Philippines in that a small group of people, many of them connected with the sugar industry, dominated its economy and government. In fact this small group, mostly *haole* (white), helped overthrow the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 and rejoiced at Hawai'i's becoming a territory of the United States in 1898 at about the same time American troops were paving the ground for a takeover of the Philippines from the Filipino revolutionaries. It seemed natural, therefore, for the sugar planters to look at the Philippines, the new American colony, as a source of cheap labor.⁷

Pablo's sojourn in Hawai'i covers roughly two periods. In the first period (1910-1919), Pablo experienced employment problems, started a family, and continued his education through self-study. The second period (1920-1934), which we shall analyze in detail, saw Pablo's development as a labor leader culminating in his participation in the strikes of 1920 and 1924. In the aftermath of the 1924 strike, Pablo was jailed and later was forced to leave Hawai'i for California where he would finish serving his parole.

On 19 December 1919 Pablo received his license from the Supreme Court of Hawai'i, thus becoming in his own words, "the first Filipino lawyer to practice law in Hawai'i."⁸ This was indeed an achievement, if we remember that when Pablo left the Philippines nine years previously he had only finished elementary education. He was so determined to change his career path that he studied by

himself for the law examinations while working as janitor and interpreter for Attorney William J. Sheldon who had an office in downtown Honolulu.

When he received his license to practice law, Pablo already had a wife and three daughters. In 1912, he had married Annie Kasby whose parents were homesteaders on the Big Island; her father was German and her mother was American. The eldest child, Alice, was born on the Big Island, while the next three (Annie, Sophie, and Pablo, Jr.) were born on O'ahu. The move to O'ahu, apparently, was motivated by employment problems. Very early on Pablo lost his job at a plantation for participating in a strike. While in Hilo, still on the Big Island, he tried his hand at different jobs including, editing a weekly, *Ang Sandata*, selling gramophones and sewing machines, running a pool hall, and interpreting for local courts. In Honolulu, he also tried various jobs including working at the docks where he was once beaten up during a strike and, as mentioned, janitor and interpreter for Attorney Sheldon.

With a family and a license to practice law, one option for Pablo was to settle down quietly in Honolulu. This meant respect for the status quo and ignoring the plight of plantation workers. In 1919 there were 24,791 Japanese workers and 10,354 Filipino workers on the plantations, representing respectively 54.7 percent and 22.9 percent of the total work force. In mid 1919 Prudencio Remigio, an official labor investigator from the Philippines, visited 22 (of the 45) sugarcane plantations in 18 days. His report contained complaints of many Filipino workers, including inadequate wages, poor housing, abusive *luna* (foremen), strict plantation police and general isolation.⁹ We do not know if Manlapit met with Remigio, but certainly Manlapit did not need to meet with him to learn about the workers' plight. At any rate at some point that year, Pablo, who had been active in community organizations and meetings, began to emerge and to assume a leadership role. His name, for instance, appeared in newspaper articles describing Filipino associations and their meetings in Honolulu.

We see Pablo's frame of mind in a written record of his meeting with Acting Governor of Hawai'i Curtis Iaukea on 7 February 1920.¹⁰ At that time more than 2,600 Filipino workers had gone out on strike on O'ahu. Pablo had gone to ask the Governor's assistance for housing the evicted strikers who had no place to stay. The Governor could not help him apart from saying over and over that he was very worried epidemics and crimes could spread and sprout in those crowded strike camps in Honolulu. An official secretary recorded how Manlapit justified the strike:

Manlapit stated that the Filipinos had repeatedly requested the planters' association for an increase in wages, on the ground that the present wages of 77 cents

a day were not sufficient. There was a bonus, it is true, but unless a man worked 20 days out of each month he was not entitled to that, and without it the wages alone were not enough. Manlapit said he considered the bonus system a scheme advantageous to the planters' side. After investigating it thoroughly he had appealed to the planters to change the wage and bonus system. The reason the laborers desired a change was so the planters could be held legally responsible to give them a living wage. They did not want to be deprived of the money they had actually earned through some failure to carry out all of the conditions of the bonus system. The situation had come to where the Filipinos were ready to starve rather than to work longer under the old plan.¹¹

In promoting workers' interests, Pablo was convinced that Filipinos and Japanese should join efforts. We can guess at the source of Pablo's ideas on interethnic cooperation. Some of his friends, like Attorney Sheldon (his former employer), Fred Makino (former leader of the Japanese plantation workers' strike in 1909), and George Wright (president of the AFL Labor Council) held the same view, and they probably influenced, if not reinforced, Pablo's thinking. His own experience in an interethnic stevedores' strike a few years back in 1916, as mentioned earlier, might have already affected his thinking. Finally, Pablo may have concluded that it was necessary to collaborate with the Japanese because, as noted above, there were more than twice as many Japanese as Filipino plantation workers.

Although Pablo was willing to assume a leadership role, he had no illusion that he had a lot of influence. He knew it was not easy playing the role of leader. In fact, while Pablo patiently waited for a Japanese pledge of cooperation, Filipino workers pushed for action with or without support from the Japanese. In the meeting cited, when Governor Iaukea asked Pablo if he had influence over the strikers, Pablo answered frankly, "My position now is that I can't advise them to return to work and I can't advise them to continue the strike unless they can get houses. If I advise them not to go back and sickness comes, then I am most responsible. If I advise them to go back, they may not go back."¹² He added that he could not really act decisively because he wanted to be fair.

As far as I am concerned, I should like to call off the strike. I have thought it over and over, and I can't sleep anymore for thinking of it. I will try to feel these people out and see what they think about going back. There is only one question: The Japanese have pledged themselves to cooperate, and I don't want to break faith with them. I want to be fair to them and to my own people—to everybody.¹³

Similarly, he had no illusion about the sugar planters' benevolence. He accepted that the planters had a right to evict strikers from their homes in the plantation camps, but he thought they were mean and unfair because they did not give the strikers sufficient time to pack up and leave.

Yes, last night I had the Filipino clubhouse (in Honolulu) filled up with people and their belongings. Men, women and children slept on the floor. These people were from 'Aiea. The plantations had driven them away and locked the doors, having given them one hour's notice, think of it, one hour. Yesterday a man came to me at 12:15 and told me that he had just been given notice to be out by 1 o'clock. The Filipinos were given no notice until yesterday.¹⁴

Moreover, Pablo knew that the planters were formidable and unyielding. When Governor Iaukea asked him how the evicted workers could be persuaded not to come to Honolulu, Pablo countered: "The only way is for the planters to be willing to meet us half way. I have tried to get them to conciliate and they won't listen."

The 1920 strike on O'ahu lasted about two months. The planters used the same approach when they broke the Japanese plantation workers' strike in 1909, which included eviction of strikers from their homes, hiring of strikebreakers, and prosecution of leaders for conspiracy. The planters also used the two main dailies (*Pacific Commercial Advertiser* and *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*) to air their views. John Waterhouse, president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, for instance, labeled the strike as "an anti-American movement designed to obtain control of the sugar business of the Hawaiian Islands."¹⁵

Unlike the Japanese leaders, Pablo was not legally prosecuted but he was subjected to a smear campaign that nearly cost him his career. The bribery charge came from F. E. Thompson, a senior member of a law firm that the sugar planters retained in January 1920 to monitor Pablo's activities. Pablo was accused of asking for a sum of money in exchange for calling off the strike. Following this, Acting Attorney General J. Lightfoot filed in March 1920 a petition for Pablo's disbarment on grounds that he had committed moral misconduct. The Hawai'i Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of evidence.¹⁶ Among Pablo's defense attorneys was William B. Pittman who would come to his defense many times more later.

Four years later in 1924, a big strike by Filipino plantation workers occurred. It lasted for five to six months with more than 2,000 plantation workers on four islands going on strike. It ended tragically when the police and strikers clashed in Hanapepe, Kaua'i resulting in the death of 20 people. Pablo Manlapit was at the forefront of this strike. Why did he step out again when he knew from experience that a strike meant trouble? A safe option was for him to stay in the margin, continue his legal work, and take care of his family. His eldest daughter, Alice, recalls the years before 1924 as happy and pleasant, going crabbing with her father, swimming in Waikiki, eating at restaurants and buying shoes by using her father's charge accounts.

In reality, Pablo Manlapit did not even lie low after the 1920 debacle. Surveillance reports gathered by the sugar planters and sent out to plantation managers show that he, together with George Wright and other Filipino leaders, paved the ground for the 1924 strike. They had meetings and talked to workers outside the plantation camps (because they were barred from the camps). In these meetings, speeches were given in English, Tagalog, Ilokano, and Visayan. An example of one of these meetings is in the report of the assistant manager at Honoka'a and Pa'auhau plantations on "Manlapit meetings" in which Pablo reportedly advocated \$2.00 as a minimum wage per day, double pay for overtime and Sunday work, shorter hours, and better living conditions for laborers who were treated as slaves. The assistant manager, nevertheless, said that the meetings were not big, attended by only from 40-50 people and that "our better class of Filipinos" was not impressed by Manlapit.¹⁷

By 1924 Pablo was convinced that he represented the Filipino workers better than anybody could, including the new labor commissioner, Cayetano Ligot, who had been appointed by the Philippine government in early 1923 to look after the interests of Filipino workers in Hawai'i. He believed that Ligot, in his efforts to protect the planters, was dissuading the Filipino workers from demanding higher wages because the planters would just turn around and recruit Chinese workers to replace them. This was deception because, according to Pablo, Ligot knew all along that the planters had made an appeal before the U.S. Congress to allow importation of Chinese workers but had failed. "Mr. Ligot knows very well that the failure to secure the coolies makes the conditions in Hawai'i such that the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association is almost wholly dependent on the Filipinos for their labor supply, and thus strengthens the cause of the laborers and makes any effort to secure higher wages and better conditions more likely to succeed." Furthermore, Pablo charged, the planters subsidized Ligot's weekly periodical which, among other things, published the planters' views uncritically. Also for Pablo, Ligot's hostility towards him was a case of "childish hostility" when compared to his own deep commitment. "I have no desire for any particular credit, or for honor or glory in competition with my activities. All I ask that I be permitted to serve my own people."¹⁸ Pablo also charged that Ligot was divisive, pitting those laborers who came from the Ilocos region against those who came from the Visayas.

Ligot believed and welcomed any bad rumor cast against Pablo. He reported back to Manila that Pablo headed a fake labor organization and all that he was interested in was to steal money from the workers. Ligot enumerated four classes of Filipinos in Hawai'i, of which the first included "caciques, demagogues, criminals, so-called leaders and self-appointed Presidents and Officers

of the fictitious Labor Union, and High Wage Movement, without Constitution nor By-Laws. These are the parasites of the honest and faithful laborers. Pablo Manlapit is the father of this class."¹⁹ In general, the sugar planters, Hawaii's Governor Farrington, and even Governor Leonard Wood of the Philippines shared Ligot's contempt for Pablo.

Pablo believed that, by asking for a living wage for the workers, he was advocating American ideals. "The keynote of Americanism, for the laborer, is the opportunity to advance—to better his condition. It is one of the cherished American ideals that each generation shall stand in advance of the preceding one, better physically, mentally, spiritually. And America demands for her workers this opportunity for development."²⁰

What is the evidence? There was a loose labor federation of which Pablo became a willing head, and perhaps it had to be loosely knit because of the far-flung location of the plantations and the strict surveillance within each plantation. As the strike spread from O'ahu to other islands like slow-moving lava, local leaders on each island assumed complete charge, such as by organizing rallies and feeding the strikers at camps on parks, roads, and beaches.²¹ John Reinecke later characterized the 1924 strike as "haphazard."²² But at the same time, he acknowledged that research is needed on these forgotten local leaders.

As soon as the strike began, troubles descended like locusts on Pablo and his family. Documents at the sugar planters' archives and newspaper accounts detail how detectives watched like hawks where Pablo went and what he did. Alice remembers some of her father's friends who sympathized with the strike but were scared to express it publicly so they visited the Manlapit home secretly late in the night. "My father was brave. In those days the Big Five were in control, everyone was afraid of them." There were big rallies at Aala Park where her father delivered long, extemporaneous speeches and where Alice and her young friends danced hula to raise funds for the strikers. The Manlapit home was open to strikers. "My father helped everybody. We had to sleep on the floor when the people from the plantation had no jobs and had no place to stay. They came to our house, we had a big house, some of them slept on the floor, and we slept on the floor right along with them. There was no difference between the strikers and us. There was absolutely no difference."

The sugar planters hounded Pablo through the courts.²³ At least three charges were brought against him in 1924. The first charge involved Pablo not providing adequate "water closets" (toilets) for the evicted strikers who were lodging temporarily in Kalihi. He was found guilty and fined \$25. The other two

charges were related to an article published in *Ang Bantay* which claimed that a sick baby of a striker (Pantaleon Enayuda) was ordered removed from the Waipahu hospital, which was managed by the O'ahu Sugar Company. The baby later died. R. J. Mermod, physician-in-charge, and E. W. Greene, plantation manager, refuted the article and filed a libel charge against Pablo who was found guilty and ordered to pay \$100.60. In mid May, Manlapit and Cecilio Basan were charged with conspiracy of the first degree for having coached Enayuda to lie. Enayuda now turned witness against Manlapit and Basan.

The trial for the conspiracy charge took place on September 15-27 or merely six days after the violent clash in Hanapepe, Kaua'i in which 16 strikers and 4 police and security men were killed. On 27 September, the jury convicted the two men, and on 11 October 1924 Justice Banks sentenced them to a term of not less than two years nor more than ten years in jail. William B. Pittman, the defense attorney, declared publicly that his clients had been railroaded. "The big interests are crying for the blood of Manlapit and Basan."²⁴ Manlapit and Basan were not even on Kaua'i when the Hanapepe incident occurred.

Armed with new affidavits signed by Enayuda and others who now admitted receiving payments for their testimonies against Pablo and Basan, Pittman later appealed the case. On 29 May 1925 the Supreme Court, however, rejected the appeal on grounds that it had been filed one day too late. Pablo entered the O'ahu prison that same day.

His imprisonment devastated his family. Neighbors came to their rescue when they saw that the family had nothing to eat but rice and soy sauce. Annie Manlapit suffered a nervous breakdown so the children had to be sent temporarily to the care of a Catholic orphanage. Upon recovery, Annie held the family together through laundry work, at first washing bus drivers' uniforms at home and then working for the American Sanitary Laundry.

Meantime, in prison, Pablo kept faith in the legal process. He petitioned Governor Farrington for pardon on grounds that he was "framed up" because the witnesses had been paid to testify against him. An affidavit from the main witness was attached to Pablo's request. Appealing to the Governor's sympathy, he urged him to reinvestigate his case. "I am absolutely penniless and helpless at this time—treated as a felon along with murderers, burglars and others thought to represent the scum of the community."²⁵ Pablo could not have guessed the extent of hostility the Governor had towards him. Governor Farrington's confidential letters to Governor General Wood in the Philippines reveal his feelings towards Manlapit, particularly after the tragic clash at Hanapepe.

It is obvious that such an outbreak must have resulted from the Filipinos being misled through inflammatory counsel or speeches of their leaders, and from our present information this attack on the police and the resulting fatalities was the result of reckless leadership by those sponsoring a strike among Filipino laborers on the plantations; and these same leaders are the ones who have been most outspoken in their attacks on Commissioner Ligot.²⁶

Governor Farrington rejected Pablo's petition. Another misfortune befell him while in jail as his critics sought to disbar him again. This time the Acting Attorney General asked the First Judicial Court to disbar Manlapit for "gross misconduct," pointing out that he had been convicted of conspiracy and sent to jail. The court disbarred him on 7 January 1926.

Neighbors and friends extended moral support. One of them was Fred Makino, a former labor leader and publisher of the *Hawaii Hochi* newspaper. When Pablo's parole became an issue in early 1927, Makino published several articles and sent an open letter to Philippine officials describing Pablo's commitment to secure a fair deal for plantation workers.

He is a man of great ability with a keen sense of justice and an intense love for his people. He devoted all his time and efforts for the cause of the strike in 1924. He sacrificed his private practice, giving everything he had to the cause of his suffering countrymen. Practically the whole burden of carrying on the struggle against the Hawaiian Sugar Planters fell upon his shoulders.²⁷

Makino also asked the Philippine officials to rally for Manlapit, but they never did.

After much public debate on his parole terms, Manlapit finally accepted Governor Farrington's conditional parole; the condition was that he should leave Hawai'i. In a farewell message, written before leaving for California, Pablo bared his case:

My offense was not against any law of morality or against any political statute, but against a system of industrial exploitation. I was railroaded to prison because I tried to secure justice and a square deal for my oppressed countrymen who are lured to the plantations to work for a dollar a day. I was kept in prison far beyond my minimum sentence because I refused to curry favor or seek concessions from those who held the power. I would not sacrifice my self-respect even for the sake of liberty.

The governor of the Territory, acting under the instructions of the little group of planters who still hate and fear me, ordered me to leave Hawai'i as the price of granting me my freedom. I am convinced that the governor will some day realize his mistake.²⁸

Stay in California and Return to Hawai'i

Large scale Filipino migration to the continental United States occurred in the mid 1920s after immigration policy stopped the flow of labor from Japan. Because the Philippines was a U.S. colony, Filipino "nationals" were excluded from the law. In 1920, 5,603 Filipinos lived in the mainland United States, of whom about 3,300 were in California. In 1930, the figures jumped; 45,208 Filipinos lived on the mainland, of whom 30,000 were in California. Their demographic profile was similar to that in Hawai'i; they were mostly single males in their teens or early twenties from the Ilocos region who wanted to work and send money back home. The main difference was that, unlike those in Hawai'i working on fixed plantations, those in the continental U.S. moved around according to the seasons, picking vegetables and fruits in the valleys of California and Washington. In the summer months, they traveled to Alaska to clean and can salmon.²⁹

The scant information we have on Pablo's California years reveals that he tried to stay out of trouble because he was still serving his parole and was intent on rejoining his family in Hawai'i once the parole was fully served. He earned a living as an insurance agent and publisher of a weekly newspaper. He kept his distance from Hilario Moncado who was spearheading a new Filipino organization. The police harassed him once in January 1928; he was picked up and detained on suspicion, never proven, that he had links with the communists. Pablo believed that the detention was "an empty gesture of his invisible enemies," whom he did not name.³⁰

Information we recently obtained through the Freedom of Information Act shows that those working within the intelligence network were convinced that Pablo was a communist because he had contacts with communists in California. "Manlapit, when he was banished from Hawai'i in September, 1927, was received with much enthusiasm by communist party leaders here and became definitely identified with the world communist movement." They were also convinced that Manlapit was thinking of organizing agricultural workers in the state, but the authorities reportedly nipped his plans. "In fact, Manlapit was so constantly under the eyes of the police that he was never able to get really started. The police also utilized a rival leader, H. C. Moncado and his organization, The Filipino Federation of America, to fight Manlapit."³¹

It must have been difficult for him not to get involved in the community because the period of his stay was a turbulent time for Filipinos on the West Coast. Many white Americans, destitute due to widespread economic depres-

sion, blamed Filipinos. Mob violence against Filipinos took place, such as the Watsonville riot in mid-January 1930 when local white males raided a clubhouse rented by Filipinos. The attack left one Filipino, Fermin Tobera, dead.³² On several occasions Pablo expressed his views on racial discrimination and exploitation of Filipinos in California at public meetings and in newspaper articles. He particularly assailed the state's anti-miscegenation laws prohibiting marriage between whites and people of color.³³

On 29 April 1932 Pablo returned to Hawai'i accompanied by Antonio A. Fagel, his new friend and convert to the cause of workers. Intelligence information also traveled to Hawai'i. "Pablo Manlapit left Los Angeles about two weeks ago en route to Honolulu, Hawai'i. For your information, for the information of Naval Intelligence in Hawai'i and for the information of O.N.I., Manlapit is probably the most able, the most intelligent and the most dangerous radical Filipino in the world."³⁴ The sugar planters placed him immediately under surveillance so that we find in the planters' archives reports on Pablo's movements and activities. For example, on July 1, the HSPA secretary John Butler informed all plantation managers that Pablo was planning to visit and speak to workers at different plantations about organizing a labor union, the recall of Commissioner Ligot (he was still in Honolulu), and remedies for unemployment. Other speakers, traveling with Pablo, were to deliver speeches in Ilokano and Visayan.³⁵ In another communication, Butler referred to Pablo as "this agitator" while a nervous manager called Pablo a "parasite."³⁶ The visits and meetings, of course, were held outside plantations. A cartoon in the *Filipino Outlook* shows Pablo asking for a pass to enter the plantation camps, and Butler says, "I am sorry Pablo, the gates are still *Kapu*."³⁷

But Pablo maintained that he and his friends (Fagel, Epifanio Taok, among others) just aimed at helping solve the new problem at hand, which was unemployment. "Contrary to insinuations and intimidations of resenting factions, the Filipino Labor Union does not advocate any attitude of rebelliousness or radicalism, nor does it desire to look forward to another Filipino strike."³⁸ Pablo and his friends, however, resumed his old quarrel with Ligot, calling him still the "publicity director" of the sugar planters.

The year 1934 brought a load of troubles for Pablo. The board members of a new federation Pablo had organized accused him of not following majority decisions. They then voted to oust him as president of the federation. That year too he followed up on his petition for full pardon only to be told by Governor Joseph Poindexter that he needed to submit other supporting papers. But Pablo could not attend to it because of another more serious problem. He was accused

and convicted of overcharging a Filipino veteran who had enlisted Pablo's help in getting a federal loan. On 8 October 1934, Pablo was sentenced to one year imprisonment or five years probation to be served outside Hawai'i. Pablo, claiming lack of funds to pursue the case, chose the latter alternative and took a ship bound for the Philippines on October 10.

Interestingly, the day before Pablo left Hawai'i, Attorney General W. B. Pittman, who was Pablo's defense attorney in 1924, penned this letter to him:

Replying to your letter of recent date as whether or not I am still of the opinion that you were innocent in 1924 and convicted on perjured testimony will state that I have reviewed the case on several occasions and have on each occasion become more convinced of your innocence and that a grave injustice was committed when you were refused a new trial. The feeling was so tense that it was impossible for you to get a fair and impartial trial.

No one could read the affidavit filed on Motion for new trial by you and not be convinced of your innocence and that you were railroaded.³⁹

His wife and four children opted to stay in Hawai'i, and they basically survived on their own without financial support from Pablo. Annie (his wife) continued her work pressing delicate, embroidered beddings at the laundry company. Alice, the eldest, now divorced with two small children, moved in with her mother and started work as a waitress at the Alexander Young Hotel cafe in downtown Honolulu. Annie, the second daughter, also did laundry work. In December 1939, Annie petitioned for and was granted a divorce from Pablo for "failure to provide."⁴⁰

Return to the Philippines

Pablo Manlapit was 43 years old in 1934 returning home for the first time since he had left the Philippines in 1910. His parents had passed away, while his three brothers (Eulogio, Guillermo, and Victor) and a sister (Luisa) were married and raising their families in Manila and vicinity. Eulogio headed a printing firm, Guillermo owned a brokerage, Victor worked for the Bureau of Customs, and Luisa was a seamstress. Eulogio's eldest daughter, Juliana, then a law student at the University of the Philippines, recalls her uncle Pablo living with them upon his arrival from Hawai'i. "He told me that he fought the sugar planters who tried to bribe him, and that he was railroaded."⁴¹

The Manlapit brothers, particularly Guillermo, were supporters of leading politicians of the day, particularly then senator Manuel Roxas, who were at the forefront of the independence campaign for the Philippines. The campaign

culminated in the establishment of the transitional Commonwealth government in 1935 with Manuel L. Quezon elected as president. Most probably as a result of his family's contacts, Manlapit found himself rubbing elbows with the country's elite. He probably did not worry much about it because the elite stood for political independence from the United States which many patriotic Filipinos had wanted since the 1896 revolution against Spain.

Pablo moved within this elite circle from the time he returned in 1934 until the mid 1950s. Like many pre-World War II labor leaders, he gravitated towards Quezon whom he had already met years before in Hawai'i and California. When the Japanese occupied the country from 1942 to 1945, Pablo was tapped to be an adviser and, later, head of a labor recruitment agency directly under President Jose P. Laurel, Jr. Pablo's photo albums and family scrapbooks contain invitations to banquets held at the Malacañang Palace during the administrations of Manuel Roxas and Elpidio P. Quirino, the first two presidents of the Philippine Republic. Pablo and his friend Fagel in Hawai'i boasted that they were among the first ones to campaign for Roxas as president. He supported Roxas over Sergio Osmeña, Sr. on grounds that Osmeña, who vetoed the "Nationalization of Retail Trade and the Nationalization of Labor" bill, was a "pernicious anti-labor President."⁴² He was appointed technical adviser at the Department of Labor during Roxas' administration, and land settlement supervisor in Mindanao during Quirino's administration.

While Pablo acted within the national political arena, workers and peasants in different parts of the country were organizing peaceful demonstrations. Prior to the Second World War, workers in Manila and in the provinces were striking. Sugarcane workers in Pampanga joined a militant organization led by Pedro Abad Santos, while dock and sugarcane workers in Iloilo and Negros joined the federation headed by Jose Nava. The Communist Party of the Philippines was formed in 1930. The resistance from workers and peasants heightened in the postwar years because the landed elite now used the instruments of the state, such as the military and the courts, to reclaim and protect their properties. The Huk peasant rebellion began in 1948 when the elected representatives of the peasants were prevented from taking their seats in Congress. Roxas feared that they would oppose his plans to give parity rights to Americans in exchange for much needed rehabilitation funds.

Ironically, Pablo saw the unrest and resistance through the lens of the politicians and landowners around him, in exactly the same way the sugar planters used to regard him in Hawai'i. The Cold War particularly affected his views for he believed that Communism was a menace to the world. "Today our

country is menaced by the Chinese communists who are now supporting the Hukbo Lahap (Hukbalahap or People's Army Against the Japanese). This is the dissident element in the country."⁴³ Consequently, he urged President Quirino to outlaw communism. "The present Korean war between the Communist-inspired North Koreans and the Republic of South Korea supported by the United Nations Organization, thru the Security Council, immediately warrants, for the future security of our Republic, the outlawing of communism in the Philippines."⁴⁴

The above account seems to show that Manlapit had changed in the Philippines. However, although Pablo Manlapit indeed worked for mainstream politicians, he also publicly expressed his ideas and opinions on certain issues. On several occasions, discussed below, he challenged the political bigwigs.

On 15 March 1947 the *Manila Chronicle* reported on its front page: "Charges of discrimination and grave irregularities in connection with the disposal of Philippine surplus property have been filed with the Commission on Appointments in Congress by Pablo Manlapit, former Filipino labor leader in Hawai'i and organizer of the first Roxas-for-President club." This was a calculated move on Pablo's part because at that precise time the Commission was conducting proceedings on the appointment of Placido L. Mapa, Arsenio M. Luz, and Gabriel K. Hernandez as officer and members of the Surplus Property Commission. This body was in charge of selling P200 million worth of American military surplus which had been turned over to the Philippine government. Leon O. Ty wrote several articles for the *Philippine Free Press* on the surplus racket by government officials and their relatives who "are now in affluent circumstances."⁴⁵ An observer, so shocked that the racket was producing millionaires, pined for the good old days under the leadership of Quezon.⁴⁶

For brief background, this surplus property was part of what Renato Constantino calls "war damage blackmail." In the aftermath of World War II, the United States passed the Philippine Rehabilitation Act ostensibly to assist the war-torn Philippines. It provided \$120 million for rebuilding roads and other infrastructure, \$100 million "worth of surplus military property," and \$400 million for damage claims from war victims. However, release of these monies depended on the Philippines' acceptance of the Bell Trade Act which had a clause giving Americans parity rights in the Philippines.⁴⁷

Pablo charged that the surplus commission sold materials to the Philippine Long Distance Telephone company at prices lower than those offered by the public works department. Also tractors were sold to Marsman and Co. and to

Judge Quirino at prices lower than Manlapit, as representative of a group of Filipino capitalists, had earlier offered. Finally, the surplus commission, Pablo claimed, awarded to Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc. a contract to sell government property at Cebu base which was not financially advantageous to the government.

The "surplus graft" hit the headlines in early May. The United States War Department sent three investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to see if U.S. Embassy officials were involved. Ramon Magsaysay, representative from Zambales, reportedly blocked the sale of Engineer Depot 16 at Caloocan to a Mr. Sweet, saving the government no less than P1 million. Commissioner Placido Mapa had claimed that there were only 24 tractors in that depot, but Magsaysay saw and recorded "no less than 189 tractors, 28 diesel road rollers, aside from bulldozers, new cranes, and road graders."⁴⁸ Three other congressmen who accompanied Magsaysay corroborated his report.

After all the furor, the surplus property commissioners received confirmation when it became clear that President Roxas himself had approved the transactions before the Surplus Property Commission was constituted. But Pablo believed that it became a lost cause because witnesses were afraid to testify against high-ranking officials. His open letter, reproduced below, summarizes his motives for raising the issue.

It is regrettable and discouraging to note that the tendency of the present surplus probe is toward a "white-wash" in view of the lack of witnesses.

I have started a campaign against a powerful government entity in the hope that other civic-spirited citizens, will, with courage, follow suit in fulfilling the difficult and arduous task of cleaning our government of corruption and graft. Much time has passed since I fired the first shot against the Surplus Property Commission but up to now even those who have knowledge of shady transactions of the SPC, have not, for fear or other reasons, come out openly against the evils that we desire to clean this government of.

If the present indifference of prospective witnesses continues, I will, much to my regret and that of the general public, be forced to stop pursuing any further my avowed objective in denouncing the high priests in our government who are not above suspicion.

My consolation, however, will be the thought that I have honestly campaigned against graft and corruption in the government and that if I failed, it is only because I was alone and too small to overpower single-handedly the "goliaths" in our government.

I have done my share as a freedom-loving citizen and from now on, I shall leave it to the public conscience for decision.⁴⁹

For the next two years (1948 and 1949) Pablo served as superintendent of the Allah Valley Project under the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA). The Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon created this body in 1939 believing that it was more effective and economical to open public virgin lands than to buy landed estates for redistribution to landless peasants. The NLSA opened three major settlement areas: Koronadal Valley and Allah Valley in Cotabato and the Mallig Plains in Cagayan Valley.⁵⁰

Antonio Paguia, the NLSA manager and Pablo's immediate boss, reported in May 1948 that the entire settlement project lacked proper funding so that no reserved areas (public domain) had been surveyed and subdivided. At the Koronadal and Allah Valleys, for instance, there were 3,000 squatters and an equal number of settlers (applicants) who could not be given lots because some 60,000 hectares had not been subdivided. In Davao's Compostela Valley, landgrabbing caused much confusion and trouble.⁵¹

Pablo embraced his job with confidence and mild pomp. He told the press that given sufficient funding to buy machinery for large-scale farming, Allah Valley could produce sufficient grain. "As a matter of fact, I know what I need in the job I am in. I need a million pesos with which to buy more tractors, plows, and other farm implements which is (sic) vital in the project in the Ala (Allah) valley."⁵² He said he was well-acquainted with large mechanized farming, knowledge he acquired when he was in Hawai'i years back. When his boss sent him to investigate conditions in Davao's Compostela Valley, Pablo told the press: "Davao should be a paradise. If Filipino labor made Hawai'i what she is now there's no reason why we can't make Davao a paradise."⁵³

In 1950 President Quirino reorganized his bureaucracy, abolished the NLSA, and with that Pablo's job and his dreams vanished. But Pablo was not deterred easily. He organized the 1,334 Allah Valley settlers to sign a petition protesting the proposed abolition of the NLSA.⁵⁴ But this was to no avail as Quirino formed LASEDECO (Land Settlement and Development Corporation) in October 1950 incorporating three dissolved entities, including the NLSA.⁵⁵ Shortly afterwards, Pablo and some 800 dismissed employees and laborers of the NLSA filed a claim in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) for gratuities and severance pay against LASEDECO. The case involved a total of P300,000. The CIR decided in favor of their claim, but the LASEDECO appealed to the Supreme Court. Finally, in December 1952, the Supreme Court upheld the CIR's decision.⁵⁶

That same year Pablo also received a full and absolute pardon from Hawaii's Governor Oren E. Long. His long and sustained effort to get that pardon since

1925 are documented in a voluminous file in the Hawai'i State Archives.⁵⁷ Pablo tried several ways to change his conviction, including petitioning for pardon and commutation of his sentence. As noted Governor Farrington did not have much sympathy for him, nor did the Board of Prison Inspectors' chair John W. Waldron who was one of the chief architects of the sugar industry. There appeared to have been a concerted effort to have Pablo stay out of Hawai'i. Around 1936, Governor Joseph B. Poindexter was inclined to grant a pardon provided Pablo pledged never to return to Hawai'i. In 1949 when Pablo visited his family in Hawai'i—and was treated like a criminal by immigration officials—Governor Ingram M. Stainback withheld granting a pardon because of possible complications with the ongoing stevedores' strike. Finally in 1952, when Pablo received his pardon, he cried like a child.⁵⁸ He thanked Governor Long because "by virtue of His act it ended my unhappy 28 years of suffering."⁵⁹ But he received this full pardon only after he gave informal assurances that he did not intend ever to live in Hawai'i.

Pablo began to associate more actively now with other labor leaders and representatives of labor in the city. He formed and chaired the United Labor Political Action Council (ULPAC) with the following, aside from himself, as members of the Executive Committee: Cipriano Cid, Vicente Raphael, Vicente Arniego, Vicente K. Olazo, and Domingo Ponce. As head of this group, he came forward in January 1953 to criticize Quirino's stand on land reform, which received much attention in the press because of Robert S. Hardie's report. Believing that Quirino's administration was committed to land reform, the United States government assigned Hardie, an agricultural economist, to draft a land reform proposal. Hardie recommended radical land reform including the abolition of tenancy which prompted Quirino to denounce the report as something communists would like. Pablo disagreed and told the *Manila Times* that ULPAC had examined the report and could not understand why certain political groupings were upset by it. He said that the report was "factual, forthright, sincere, precise, and accurate," and its recommendations were "well thought out, thorough and farseeing."⁶⁰

ULPAC launched a Labor Party in September 1953 and supported Pablo's candidacy as representative for the 1st district of Manila. A campaign brochure explained "Why we should vote for Pablo Manlapit:"

This man who should be living a life of peace has chosen once more to take up the cudgels for the common man on the street whose conditions of living is (sic) no different from those he saw in 1910 among the sugar plantation workers in Hawai'i and which made him forsake the easy life for the life of a missionary desirous to help those less fortunate than him.⁶¹

Pablo did not win but he now rekindled a mission, at 62 years old, to advocate for workers like he once did in Hawai'i by joining them in meetings, strikes, and negotiations for collective bargaining. He acted as technical adviser to the Philippine Labor Unity Movement (PLUM), a new labor federation formed by Attorney Vicente Raphael in 1953. Among the cases he helped resolve was the Sta. Cecilia Sawmills, Inc. where sawmill workers had struck for overtime pay. This company, located in Quezon province, belonged to the prominent family of Tomas Morato, Jr.⁶² Overall Pablo may have found satisfaction and new vigor doing union work, but it required much sacrifice from his family.

Pablo established a second family in the Philippines. He met his wife, Ponciana Calderon, in a small restaurant where he frequently took his meals. She was born on 14 March 1914 to small farmers in barrio Magubay, Calbayog, Samar. After her mother died, she helped raise her brothers and sisters. In addition to farming, they augmented their income by fishing and weaving mats from coconut palms. An older cousin, also a mat weaver, invited Ponciana to go with her to Manila in 1932; she was 18 years old. Then in the city she met a friend who invited her to work in a tobacco farm up north in Isabela. She worked there for a couple of years or so, got married, and gave birth to a baby girl. The marriage or partnership later broke up. In 1936 Ponciana was back in Manila working at a little restaurant where she met Pablo. Their son, Romeo, was born the next year.

Ponciana Manlapit recalls that her husband, concerned with integrity and ethics, did not want to apply for any parcel of land while connected with the National Land Settlement Administration. He never wanted to use his position or influence to acquire wealth or property.⁶³ Their only piece of property, a small wooden house on Elias Street, Sta. Cruz, was sold in the mid 1950s to meet pressing financial problems. Romeo had to interrupt his college studies to find work and help support his parents. Part of his salary as a geodetic survey employee went to pay for his parents' house rent; a rich cousin also regularly contributed money. But he noticed that although they were hard up, workers on strike and their families came to their house, slept and ate there, and even received pocket money from his impoverished father.⁶⁴ The experience in Hawai'i, Romeo believed, had influenced his father to think first of the needs of others.

Romeo described his father a few days before he died: "*Napapabuntong hininga siya kung nakikita niya ang aking ina at ako na nakaupo sa kaniyang kama sa isang charity hospital.*" (He could not help but sigh each time he looked

at my mother and me as we sat on his bed in a charity hospital.)⁶⁵ Pablo Manlapit died on 15 April 1969.

Conclusion

At first glance, Manlapit's activities in Hawai'i and in the Philippines are at opposite poles. In Hawai'i he challenged the oligarchy by being at the forefront of the Filipino plantation workers who demanded better pay and working conditions. In contrast, once back in the Philippines, he served the national political elite and did not get involved in organized labor until much later. His motives for acting as he did in Hawai'i included, as he put it, fighting for justice for workers. His reasons for opting to be at the side of the political elite in the Philippines are varied. We suggested that he gravitated towards that inner circle because his brothers had connections with the national politicians. He also regarded Quezon and other politicians as genuine advocates for independence. In addition, he believed that Roxas was sympathetic to the working class.

His commitment in Hawai'i becomes clear if we look at his options there. As a newly licensed attorney with a wife and four young children to support, he could have chosen a settled life in Honolulu. Instead he joined Japanese and Filipino workers in demanding for improved working conditions on the plantations. Then in 1924, knowing from experience the hardships strikes entailed, he chose to join the strike and became its major leader, if not the strike's symbol of resistance against the planters.

In the Philippines, although he served the national elite, we see that his commitment to serving them was not full and steadfast. At times, he was an ardent critic calling for reforms. Thus during President Roxas's administration he was one of the first government officials to assail graft and corruption in the sale of government military surplus. Later, he supported the land reform recommendations in the Hardie Report, which Quirino had denounced as communist. These are examples to show that Pablo was not a good team player because he chose to speak up against what he called corrupt "goliaths."

In one basic way, Manlapit in Hawai'i and in the Philippines showed a consistency in character. Confronted with choices like personal or family comforts and public or social responsibility, he chose the latter. The options he took led to hardships for him and his families both in Hawai'i and the Philippines. In Hawai'i, he was disbarred, sent to jail, deported to California, and separated from his family. The Manlapits in Hawai'i struggled on their own and survived without him. In the Philippines, he did not actively seek material comforts for

himself and his family because, among other things, he preached and practiced integrity as a government official. Finally, his financial situation worsened when he resumed involvement in workers' issues. It may be that other documents we have not seen will someday show another picture of Pablo Manlapit and his motives, which should lead to another interpretation of his life. But for now, we share Romeo Manlapit's assessment of his father:

Ang mga nagdaang kahapon ni Pablo Manlapit ay mapait para sa pamilya niyang naiwan. Maging sa Hawai'i at maging sa Pilipinas ang mga naiwanan niyang mga anak ay bali ang pakpak na tumayo sa sarili at na sumikap upang mabuhay ng maayos na may nakaakibat na kahirapan.

Ang iniisip ko at ng aking ina ay walang pagsisisi sa mga naganap sa aming buhay. Ang foundation na itinayo ni Pablo para sa kanyang pamilya maging sa Hawai'i at Pilipinas ay larawan lamang sa uri ng kanyang pagkatao dahil sa kanyang paniniwala at damdaming nasa dugo bilang lahing Pilipino. Mali sa kaisipan doon sa mga taong ang hangad ay interes lamang para sa pansariling kagustuhan at marangyang kaanyuan. Totoo na siya ay nagsikap subalit kapos ang kanyang kakayahan upang mapaunlad ang sarili niyang gulong ng buhay. Sa kanyang karanasan ito'y magsisilbing aral para sa kanyang mga naiwan. Para sa akin siya ay mabuti. Naabot ko marahil ang kalahati ng kanyang karunungan at observation sa tunay na pagdadala ng buhay.⁶⁶

(Pablo Manlapit's past is bitter for his families. Both in Hawai'i and in the Philippines his children had "broken wings" to stand on their own and faced hardships as they tried to survive and live comfortably.)

My mother and I feel no regrets about the past. The foundation Pablo built for his families in Hawai'i and the Philippines shows his basic humanity reinforced by his beliefs and principles as a Filipino. It is wrong for people to think only of personal interests and material comforts. He did try to improve his life but he lacked the capability to change his own destiny. His experience serves as a lesson for those he left behind. As for me, I regard him as a good man. Perhaps I've achieved half of his intelligence and understanding on how to live truly.)

Endnotes

1. The author interviewed Pablo Manlapit's children (Alice Manlapit Savard and Romeo Manlapit), nieces (Juliana Manlapit and Isabel Dimagiba David), and nephew (Delfin Manlapit Dimagiba) between 1990 and 1995.
2. Teodoro M. Kalaw, *Aide-de-Camp to Freedom* (Manila: Teodoro M. Kalaw Society, Inc., 1965), pp. 1-2 and Glenn Anthony May, *Battle for Batangas* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). According to Kalaw (1884-1940), there were three classes in Lipeño society: class one or the "people of quality," class two or the professionals, and class three composed of laborers, artisans, servants, tenants and other workers. He said that his family belonged to class two.
3. Many workers, for instance, in Manila's cigar and cigarette factories, moved from the provinces to the city for better employment opportunities. See Melinda Tria Kerkvliet, *Manila Workers' Unions, 1900-1950*, pp. 52-53. As migration to the city escalated, the population of Metropolitan Manila "quadrupled to more than 900,000" from 1900 to 1941. See Daniel F. Doepfers, *Manila 1900-1941* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1984), pp. 4-5.
4. Pablo Manlapit, "Autobiography," handwritten, 1959.
5. *Taliba* (Manila), 27 March 1913, p.2
6. Ruben Alcantara, "1906: The First Sakada," in *The Filipinos in Hawai'i: The First 75 Years* (Honolulu: Hawai'i Filipino News Specialty Publications, 1981), pp. 27-50.
7. For more information on the Hawaiian monarchy and the sugar barons, see Gavan Daws, *Shoal of Time, A History of the Hawaiian Islands* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawai'i, 1968) and Lawrence H. Fuchs, *Hawai'i Pono, A Social History* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961).
8. Manlapit, "Autobiography."
9. Prudencio A. Remigio, *Report of the Commissioner to Hawai'i, 1919*. (Translated from Spanish by Edgar Knowlton and published by the Filipino Historical Society of Hawai'i, 1982.)
10. "Conference held on Saturday, February 1, 1920 with Pablo Manlapit, President of Filipino Labor Federation," Miscellaneous File, Strike Data, 1920, Governor Charles McCarthy Papers, Hawai'i State Archives.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
15. Quoted in Ronald Takaki, *Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawai'i, 1835-1920* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1983), p. 172.

16. Hawai'i First Circuit Court, Docket #10.
17. Asst. Manager, Honoka'a Sugar Co. and Pacific Sugar Mill to Messrs. F. A. Schaefer and Co. Ltd., 23 April 1923, Folder 8/12, Honoka'a Sugar Co., HSPA Archives.
18. Pablo Manlapit, Chairman, High Wages Movement to Hon. Hermenegildo Cruz, Acting Director, Bureau of Labor, Manila, P. I., 11 October 1923, File 2736-2-3, Record Group 165, The National Archives, Washington, D. C.
19. Cayetano Ligot to Hon. Leonard Wood, 10 September 1923, Quezonian Papers on Filipinos in Hawai'i, Hamilton Library, University of Hawai'i.
20. Pablo Manlapit, *Filipinos Fight for Justice: Case of the Filipino Laborers in the Big Strike of 1924* (Honolulu: Kumalae Publishing Co., 1933), p. 26.
21. See, for instance, the oral histories in *The 1924 Filipino Strike on Kaua'i* (Honolulu: Ethnic Studies Oral History Project, University of Hawai'i).
22. Actually, Reinecke overestimates Manlapit's role. He refers to the 1924 strike as "instigated and led by Pablo Manlapit." John Reinecke, *The Filipino Piecemeal Sugar Strike of 1924-1925*, unpublished manuscript, n.d., p. 1.
23. For a summary of court cases against Pablo Manlapit, see Melinda Tria Kerkvliet, "Pablo Manlapit's Fight for Justice," in Jonathan Y. Okamura, et al., eds., *The Filipino American Experience in Hawai'i* (Honolulu: Department of Sociology, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, 1991), pp. 159-160.
24. *Honolulu Advertiser*, 12 October 1924, p. 2.
25. Manlapit's letter and a copy of the affidavit, which had been translated from Spanish to English, is in Special Proceedings #62, Hawai'i First Circuit Court.
26. Governor W. R. Farrington to Governor-General Leonard Wood, 6 October 1924, Farrington Papers, Hawai'i State Archives.
27. Fred K. Makino to Honorable Manuel Quezon, President of the Senate, 16 November 1925, enclosing "An Open Letter to the Government of the Philippines." A copy of this document is in Quezonian Papers on Filipinos in Hawai'i, Hamilton Library, University of Hawai'i.
28. The full text is printed in the *Honolulu Advertiser*, 14 August 1927, pp. 1ff.
29. An excellent background on this topic is by Susan Evangelista, *Carlos Bulosan and His Poetry: A Biography and Anthology* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1985).
30. Pablo Manlapit to the Governor of the Territory of Hawai'i (Lawrence M. Judd), 14 December 1929, File 155, Records of Quasi-Judicial Executive Actions, Hawai'i State Archives. According to one rumor, Hilario Moncado told the police that Pablo was a communist. See J. K. Butler (HSPA Secretary) to Governor Wallace R. Farrington, 18 September 1928, Farrington Papers, Hawai'i State Archives.

31. Quoted statements in this paragraph are from a document dated 11 May 1932, Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington. I wish to thank Alice Mak for helping me search for this previously classified information.
32. The Watsonville riot is analyzed by Bruno Lasker, *Filipino Immigration to Continental United States and to Hawai'i* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931), Appendix E.
33. See, for instance, *Three Stars* (Stockton), May 1931.
34. From document dated 11 May 1932, cited above.
35. Butler to Plantations on O'ahu, 1 July 1932, Folder 25/5, Honoka'a Sugar Co., HSPA Archives.
36. Butler to Plantation Managers on Hawai'i, 13 July 1932, *ibid.*; W. P. Naquin, Manager to Messrs. F. A. Schaefer & Co., Ltd., 26 July 1932, Folder 16/2, Honoka'a Sugar Co., HSPA Archives.
37. *The Filipino Outlook* (Honolulu), February 1934, p. 1.
38. Pablo Manlapit, "What is the Filipino Labor Union?," *The Union* (Honolulu), 15 October 1932, p. 2. Described as the "voice of working man in Hawai'i," this weekly journal was edited by N. C. Villanueva and published by Pablo himself. Villanueva later worked for an HSPA-sponsored radio program featuring Filipino music and community issues.
39. A copy of this letter is in File 575, Records of Quasi-Judicial Executive Actions, Hawai'i State Archives.
40. Decree of Divorce, 5 December 1939, Hawai'i First Court.
41. Interview with Juliana Manlapit, 21 August 1991, Quezon City.
42. Manlapit to Roxas, 22 November 1945, Roxas Papers.
43. Pablo Manlapit, "Proposed Speech to the Waterfront Strikers," 13 July 1949, in Everett U. Afook, "Report for the Attorney General (Subject: Pablo Manlapit), 19 July 1949, File 575, Records of Quasi-Judicial Executive Actions, Hawai'i State Archives.
44. Pablo Manlapit to President Elpidio Quirino, *Report on I. The Illegality of the Communist Party of the Philippines; II. The Functions of the Special Committee on Un-Filipino Activities* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1951), p. 12.
45. Leon O. Ty, "Racket in Army Surplus Goods," *Philippine Free Press* (Manila), 12 April 1947, p. 4.
46. Rodrigo C. Lim, "Quezon and these Surplus Scandals," *Philippine Free Press* (Manila), 26 April 1947, p.14.
47. Renato Constantino and Letizia R. Constantino, *The Philippines: The Continuing Past* (Quezon City: The Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978), pp. 202-203.

48. *The Evening Herald* (Manila), 5 May 1947, p. 8.
49. "Deplores his aloneness in the fight," newspaper clipping (no date nor name of newspaper), Manlapit Papers.
50. For background, see Cayetano W. Paderanga, Jr., *A Review of Land Settlements in the Philippines* (Mindanao Studies Reports, 1995/No.2, University of the Philippines, Center for Integrative and Development Studies).
51. Antonio Paguia, Manager, NLSA, "Memorandum for the Honorable Members of both Chambers, Congress of the Philippines," 8 May 1948, Box 39, Quirino Papers, Ayala Museum and Library, Metro Manila. The situation in Davao is described in the *Mindanao Times*, 1 December 1948, p. 1.
52. *Manila Chronicle*, 2 March 1948, n. p., Manlapit Papers.
53. *Mindanao Times*, 1 December 1948, p. 1.
54. This information is from a letter by Emilio Abello, Executive Secretary to President Quirino, 12 July 1948, Manlapit Papers.
55. Board of Directors of LASEDECO, "Resolution No. 647: Expressing Appreciation of his Excellency, the President of the Philippines for the enactment of House Bill No. 3093," Box 39, Quirino Papers, Ayala Museum and Library.
56. *Manila Times*, 25 December 1952, n. p., Manlapit Papers.
57. File 575, Records of Quasi-Judicial Executive Actions, Hawai'i State Archives.
58. *Evening News* (Manila), 11 July 1952 clipping in Manlapit Papers.
59. Pablo Manlapit to Governor Oren E. Long, 8 February 1952, File 575.
60. Paul M. Monk, *Truth and Power: Robert S. Hardie and Land Reform Debates in the Philippines, 1950-1987*. (Monash University: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash Paper, No. 20, 1990), p. 49.
61. The document is among the Manlapit Papers.
62. Interview with Jesus P. Robleza, 9 May 1995, Manila. Robleza, 72 years old, is current president of PLUM. He remembers Pablo Manlapit's activities with PLUM but is not able to provide relevant workers' case files. There are clippings, some with photos, in Manlapit Papers showing Pablo giving speeches and attending union meetings.
63. Interviews with Ponciana Manlapit, 21 August 1991 and 25 January 1994, Quezon City.
64. From interviews with Romeo C. Manlapit, 21 August 1991, 25 January 1994 and 12 May 1995, Quezon City, and several letters to the author.
65. Romeo C. Manlapit to author, 30 March 1994, p. 7.
66. Romeo C. Manlapit to author, 30 March 1994.